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Knowing who we are, and where we are, are two fundamental aspects of our physical
and mental experience. Although the domains of spatial and social cognition are often
studied independently, a few recent areas of scholarship have explored the interactions
of place and self. This fits in with increasing evidence for embodied theories of cognition,
where mental processes are grounded in action and perception. Who we are might be
integrated with where we are, and impact how we move through space. Individuals vary
in personality, navigational strategies, and numerous cognitive and social competencies.
Here we review the relation between social and spatial spheres of existence in the
realms of philosophical considerations, neural and psychological representations, and
evolutionary context, and how we might use the built environment to suit who we are, or
how it creates who we are. In particular we investigate how two spatial reference frames,
egocentric and allocentric, might transcend into the social realm. We then speculate
on how environments may interact with spatial cognition. Finally, we suggest how a
framework encompassing spatial and social cognition might be taken in consideration
by architects and urban planners.
Keywords: spatial cognition, social cognition, navigation, personality, reference frames, allocentric frame of
reference, egocentric frame of reference, cognitive neuroscience
INTRODUCTION
Understanding the nature of spatial knowledge is a classical issue in psychology, philosophy, and
behavioral biology; it is also a core practical problem for architects designing effective buildings.
Heidegger (1962) suggested that human beings are always spatial beings when addressing how
we find ourselves in the world, a space shaped by the activities we engage in. Such a view might
appeal to adherents of embodied cognition, who take the perspective that thought itself is emergent
from the interaction between the environment, the body, and the mind (Wilson and Golonka,
2013). Our interaction with space may also define what human beings are capable of, and how
we define ourselves. In modern times investigations on the attributes of spatial cognition receive a
considerable amount of attention (Klatzky, 1998; Burgess, 2006; Mou et al., 2007), and best practice
in architecture and urban planning requires knowledge of spatial cognitive abilities to create
practical, safe, efficient, and accessible environments (Marquardt and Schmieg, 2009; Marquardt,
2011).
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Knowing the location of the objects around and how to reach
them is crucial for carrying out the vast majority of organism’s
activities. The nature of an organism’s plastic spatial relationship
to the environment is also a defining quality of its identity. As
mobile beings, we rarely remain in one place for a long period
of time. It is imperative to our physical and social survival that
we travel to different locations to perform daily tasks, visit with
family and friends, and exercise. These tasks require an accurate
spatial representation of our environment for proper navigation,
perhaps through a cognitive map (Tolman, 1948). Real-world
navigation requires a combination of cognitive skills such as
object recognition (what), localization (where), and obstacle
avoidance (how; Maguire et al., 1999). Theories of embodied
cognition do not include a role for representations, though
grounded cognition (Barsalou, 2008) allows for representations
which are grounded in perceptual experience.
The perception of space has long been seen as a special task for
perception in general, and vision in particular. Already a century
ago Helmholtz (von Helmholtz, 1962), and later Gibson (Gibson,
1950), were intrigued, physiologically and psychologically, by
the origin of spatial cognition and the role of vision. David
Marr wrote in his book Vision that the common definition
(and Aristotle’s, too) for seeing is to “know what is where, by
looking” (Marr, 1982, p. 3). Sight is the primary sense that
humans use to know not only what is where, but also to know
the locations of things in relation to the self and others. One
major question in perceptual research is how our visual system
is able to create this spatial representation and subsequently
perceive distances between ourselves and other objects. Thus,
much of what we understand about human spatial perception
has taken a visual sciences approach. However, vision is only
one way of experiencing space; research has suggested that other
senses represent space differently. What are the implications of
individual differences in spatial perception?
With a grounding in evolutionary theory, we review the role
of individual differences in spatial tasks, and conversely, how the
built environment can restrict or promote spatial cognition, and
how that influences one’s selfhood. Figure 1 provides a schematic
of our approach in this paper. We aim to influence the building
of environments to take into account individual differences,
ability, and disability. Critically, traditional discipline-based
approaches are insufficient to create a breakthrough in revealing
the relationship between spatial cognition and the self, to detail
the full implications for self-identity and application for the built
environment, and to start by clarifying the terms as used in
each field. First, we provide clear cross-disciplinary definitions
of terms linking these concepts. “Egocentric” and “allocentric”
are terms that are used quite broadly in academic literature, but
it is not clear that their usage is consistent across disciplines. In
some cases, different usages may be due to simply using the same
label for a different construct. For example, the term “egocentric”
in particular is most often used to describe a personality type
rather than a spatial reference frame. The term “allocentric”
generally has only a spatial use, in terms of defining object
locations to one another, rather than in relation to the self
in an egocentric reference frame. The dual use of these terms
in spatial and personal contexts may have arisen by chance.
However, theories of grounded, and even embodied, cognition
suggest that the similarity of the definitions could actually imply
a common ontology, which in turn could reveal shared concepts
and mechanisms (Barsalou, 2008). That is discrepancies in the
usage of these terms might actually reveal a shared underlying
connection with a latent relation between spatial processing and
aspects of individual differences and self-awareness. Therefore,
this paper explores whether who we are is defined by where we
are. “Who” is considered in the concepts of the ego, the self, the
social self, and in personality. “Where” is considered on various
spatial scales and environments.
We explore whether seemingly different intended usages of
the terms egocentric and allocentric are in fact related, in terms
of neuroanatomical or behavioral attributes. Thus, amajor goal of
this paper is to review how these terms have been used, and clarify
what these terms actually mean in theoretical, experimental,
evolutionary, and applied contexts (cf. Proulx et al., 2014). There
are a myriad of ways in which our spatial coordinates and
our “selves” are intertwined. Investigating the self in humans
and non-human animals from social and spatial perspectives
may help explain how spatial factors interact with personality,
self, and perception. This framework has an important broader
impact. Optimizing spaces for the wellbeing of all is a critical
job for architects and urban planners. This paper, through
the interacting topics illustrated in Figure 1, demonstrates how
architecture might take guidance from data about how the mind
works from fields such as neuroscience, psychology, philosophy,
anthropology, and behavioral biology.
EGO: DEFINING THE SELF AND ITS PLACE
IN SPACE
How the Ego Creates the Self: A Product of
Personality and the Environment
Why do individuals respond to environmental stimuli
differently? How do our interactions in social and spatial
environments relate to who we are? In this section we first
provide an overview of personality theories, and then expand
this into an overview of theories about ego, self, and personality.
Thus, we describe a conceptualization in which the self is
determined by an interaction between an individual’s personality
and environmental factors (including social and spatial factors).
We further develop this to consider how extreme differences in
environment and sensory ability could play a role in shaping the
self. Finally, we introduce the terms egocentric and allocentric
from the perspective of personality theory.
The roles of the ego, self, and personality as constituents of
the mind have been a hot topic of debate over the last century,
with definitions and postulations regarding their unity, diversity
and function, changing with time and with shifts in paradigms
(Baumeister, 1987). Currently, a contemporary convergent view
has emerged linking self, personality, and the mind. The mind
has been defined by Minsky as “what brains do” (Minsky,
1988), that is, thinking, understanding, and learning (Perner,
1991), and the self as a product of the mind, proposed to
emerge as phenomenon related to the experienced, sensed, and
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FIGURE 1 | An illustration of the approach taken in this review. Central to the review are the concepts of self and spatial cognition, which are connected by the
consideration of egocentric and allocentric reference frames. These provide the context to move from a foundation in evolutionary theory to applications for the built
environment.
understood (Demetriou and Kazi, 2001). According to that same
view, personality provides the dispositions through which an
organism perceives and interacts with the world, and as such
provides a framework for the mind to operate within (Ferrari
and Sternberg, 1998). Therefore, the self can be thought of as a
reference frame of themind derived from the interaction between
personality dispositions and the environment. The ego is that
which creates the self, and these are a product of personality and
the environment (Lewin et al., 1936; Wayment et al., 2015).
In their recent work on “the quiet ego” self-identity, Bauer
andWayment find that in modern scientific psychology the term
ego is either synonymous with the term self, or it describes the
process which creates the self (Bauer and Wayment, 2008). They
prefer defining the ego as a process, and we also find that this
leads directly to the approach that the ego is a frame of reference
in both social and spatial interactions. Wayment et al. elaborate
on the conceptualization of the ego as a frame of reference for
the self by pointing to parallels between the terms “ego” vs.
“self,” and William James’ concepts of “I” vs. “Me”: just as the I
frames the Me, the ego frames the self (Wayment et al., 2015).
According to their working definition, the ego is that which does
the thinking, and the self is produced by the ego (including one’s
conceptions of physical self, social self, and psychological self). It
is this extension of James’ definitions which we feel best applies
in the current context.
There are multiple (but not necessarily exclusive) ways of
understanding the self which are relevant to personality, and to
social and spatial cognition. Here we review the classic theories
of the self in an historical perspective as these serve as the
foundation of modern studies of the self, and provide the clearest
links to philosophy and behavioral biology. Important steps
toward understanding and defining the self are, first, clearly
defining personality and, second, demarcating the domains of
operation of the mind. The latter is comprehensively covered by
the concept of cognitive abilities: the adaptive abilities related
to knowledge acquisition, understanding, and learning (Jensen,
1998). Defining personality is perhaps an even more daunting
task, which can incorporate different fields of study (for example,
the aim could be either scientific or spiritual; perspectives can
take from zoology or be strictly human-centered), and can vary
also according to the desired scope and rigidity of the definition.
Given that the initial interest in the study of personality
was inspired by research in humans, in one of the earliest
attempts, Allport defined it as “the dynamic organization within
the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine
his characteristics, behavior, and thought” (Allport, 1937). He
suggested that personality might be biologically determined at
birth, but also shaped by environment and experiences. Another
well-known, early attempt to describe personality’s development
and structure came from Freud (1923). He recognized the role
of development on personality and proposed several sensitive
developmental stages modulating the set of personality traits.
One of his contributions was the delineation between the id,
the ego, and the super-ego, as the main constituents of human
personality—id (Latin: “that”) was defined as inherited biological
(unconscious) tendencies and drives of the personality, the
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super-ego was defined as incorporating the morals and values of
the society which one acquires throughout development from
their social sphere, and the ego (Latin: “I”) was defined as
the result of the interplay of these two processes—mediating
and modulating id’s desires according to the requirements of
the super-ego (Freud, 1923). Thus, Freud acknowledged the
fact that personality has both public (super-ego) and personal
(ego) aspects that one might be consciously aware of, and some
of which are inherently unknowable to the individual (those
covered by the id).
Another attempt to define and deconstruct personality
was trait theory. One of its proponents, Eysenck, proposed
that personality might be explained by as few as three
general, orthogonal, personality traits—namely extraversion,
neuroticism, and psychoticism (Eysenck, 1963). Eysenck
attributed personality differences to differences in the
functioning of the autonomic nervous system dependent
on the balance and specifics of neuronal excitation and
inhibition, and thus moving closer to a neurobiological
framework for understanding personality differences (Hegerl
et al., 1995). He recognized personality differences as dispositions
influencing how one relates and interacts with the world and
his theory was developed into the Big-Five personality model
(Digman, 1990), comprising of the following five traits:
Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and
Neuroticism. Thus, far, the Big-Five model is accepted as the
most comprehensive and concise model, explaining most of the
variation of human personality traits (Digman, 1990).
After acknowledging that personality differences might
be ubiquitous in animal life and not exclusively human
property, Gosling (Gosling, 2008) defines personality as “those
characteristics of individuals that describe and account for
temporally stable patterns of affect, cognition, and behavior”
(Gosling and John, 1999). Among researchers working on
non-human animals, the term behavioral syndromes is used
preferentially, but yet, interchangeably with the term personality
in human studies (Gosling, 2008). Following the steps of
personality research in humans, the trait approach has become
dominant in the studies in non-human animal, too. Such studies
have so far identified several stable individual traits, that are
also expressed across different populations in numerous species,
such as the shy–bold axis (Sloan Wilson et al., 1994; Coleman
and Wilson, 1998), the proactive–reactive axis (Koolhaas et al.,
1999), and exploratory behavior (Verbeek et al., 1994). Thus,
personality differences have been used to describe the predictable
behaviors of individual non-humans as well, in species ranging
from orangutans (Weiss et al., 2011) to honeybees (Liang et al.,
2012).
The concept of the self is much more recent than the concept
of personality, both in terms of it being a recent philosophical
consideration, and it terms of how it arises from the natural
world. It has been suggested to be a “created problem”—one
arising from the pursuit to define and redefine identity over time
(Baumeister, 1987) and thus difficult to define unequivocally.
Whereas, personality can be directly grounded in natural
phenomena, the self seems to be an emergent phenomenon:
a product of the interaction of the evolved capability of
self-awareness and other environment-oriented, domain-
specific representational, and interaction systems, involved in
conceptualizing relationships in the environment in both the
cognitive and the social domains (Demetriou, 2003). Because self
exists at that intimate level, the modifier “self ” is often used as an
adjective to describe the individualized experiences of the person.
It is related to concepts like self-awareness, self-esteem, self-
knowledge, and self-perception and was defined by Baumeister
(1987) as emerging “at the interface between the inner biological
processes of the human body and the sociocultural network to
which the person belongs.”
A turning point in conceptualizing the self was the theory
of Maslow (1968), in which he emphasized the importance of
self-fulfillment. Derived from the writings of Heidegger (1927)
Maslow proposed that the present self is defined by its dynamism;
it is defined in terms of the efforts made toward changing into
its future form. He suggested that the self has potentialities for
future existences, and only by understanding these so called self-
actualization drives, one can truly understand the self. Thus, the
concept of potential fulfillments is thought to give meaning to the
present self, and in that way the self can be thought of as a “plan”
or a motive for fulfillment of potentials, based on the state of the
current self and on personality. A number of recent reviews have
discussed recent advancements of theories of the self (Gilovich,
2002; Forgas andWilliams, 2014), thoughmany of these take root
in the same historical review we have provided here.
Both spatial and social behaviors directly impact the self.
Firstly, in the aforementionedmodern view, the self is considered
to be a product of the representational and interaction systems of
the organism and its environment (including spatial and social
factors), as modulated and mediated by the personality. Further,
in self-aware individuals, the self is a product of the ability of the
organism to be aware of mental states and attention in others
(Reddy, 2003). Demetriou (2003) proposed that the self is the
product of several factors which he classifies as environment-
oriented systems which are comprised of six different functional
modules of cognitive functioning—categorical, quantitative,
causal, spatial, propositional, social, and pictographic system.
The self, understood as a reference frame of the mind
derived from the interaction between personality dispositions
and these environment-oriented systems, is thus a product of
the individual’s social and spatial interactions, among others
(Humphrey, 2011). Just like one’s categorical or propositional
systems influence one’s ideology and the way one sees and
processes its environment (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1981), spatial and social systems, too, have a
crucial role in understanding the self, and its potentials which it
is striving to fulfill. Thus, a crucial step toward understanding the
essence of the self is to delineate and elucidate the specific social
and spatial strategies, and their interaction with personality. Such
consideration can provide a means for the individual to fulfill the
potential of their self in the most optimal way.
By extension of this framework, extreme differences in
environment or sensory ability could, along with personality,
have a significant interaction with the self. First, sensory
disabilities (such as blindness and deafness) and environmental
constraints (such as solitude or confinement) can modify an
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individual’s interaction with the environment, in particular
by preventing social and spatial interactions and limiting
perception. In addition, they could have an impact on
personality, and thus have an impact on the self in this manner.
Second, personality influences how the external environment
is perceived. Much research and theoretical development has
noted the role of attention for consciousness (Dehaene et al.,
2006) [though admittedly controversial Van Boxtel et al., 2010],
such that one is consciously aware of only that to which one
pays attention, whether with simple visual search task (Joseph
et al., 1997), or more complex video displays (Simons and
Chabris, 1999). Personality traits influence what one attends to.
For example, in emotion-induced blindness, there is impairment
in visual processing due to attention to an emotional stimulus.
The degree to which emotional stimuli can alter visual attention
is directly related to a personality trait: harm avoidance (Most
et al., 2005). Thus, one’s personality creates a reference frame,
via attentional prioritization, of what is valued, and therefore
attended to, in the environment (Anderson et al., 2011).
The ways in which we sense and perceive the world could
influence the sense of who we are in personality and social
domains. Although there have not been reports of different
personality dimensions for visually impaired persons, higher
levels of anxiety have been noted (Donoyama and Takeda, 2007;
Donoyama and Munakata, 2009), and this has been shown to
influence the expression and character of one’s personality. Thus,
although visual impairment does not influence personality per
se, it can affect the expression and perception of personality
linked behaviors (Zahran, 1965; Coren and Harland, 1995; Reid,
2000), and provides an important method for examining whether
visual experience rather than innate mechanisms shape social
and spatial behavior. Further, sensory abilities influence social
interactions—standard social interaction is multisensory, though
often driven by visual experiences such as facial, emotional,
and body expressions. Although, as discussed, personality is
influenced by several systems, the social system is largely the
focus, because personality is visible in the social domain. For
example, according to Furnham, personality comprises the
correlated states, traits, and expectations of behavior in social
settings (Furnham, 1992).
Egocentric or Allocentric: Individual
Differences in Spatial Reference Frames
and Personalities
The terms “egocentric” and “allocentric” are used in both
social and spatial domains. Theories of grounded cognition are
built on the notion that mental concepts and representations
are not merely semantic, and thus amodal, but instead are
grounded in sensorimotor experience and interactions with
the environment (Barsalou et al., 2003; Barsalou, 2008). Such
grounding implies that there could be a common source for these
reference frames in both the social and spatial domains. Here we
define reference frames in the spatial sense, review evidence for
individual differences in reference frames in cognition, and then
describe how reference frames interact with self-perception and
personality.
The concept of a frame of reference has is origins in describing
spatial coordinates and is still used in physics to describe “a
system of coordinate axes in relation to which size, position, or
motion can be defined” (Dictionary, 2015). However, this term
has since been broadened in its usage to describe an aspect of a
cognizant being, whose frame of reference (or reference frames,
frames of mind, and framing) influences behavior. The ways in
which one can mentally represent the locations of things are
called spatial reference frames. Egocentric and allocentric are
two general forms of spatial reference frames (see Figure 2). An
egocentric reference frame is where one denotes the location of
something else in reference to oneself. In contrast, an allocentric
reference frame is where the location of something else is in
reference to yet another object, independent of oneself (Byrne
et al., 2007). For example, a person in the UK could define the
location of France compared to himself in an egocentric sense,
or instead define the location of France compared to Germany
instead, in an allocentric sense. The reference frame used may
interact with other, non-spatial domains of cognition, such as
social cognition.
There has been much discussion about how, in practice, space
is actually represented cognitively in humans and other animals,
and whether one of the frames of reference dominates, or they
necessarily work together (Wang and Spelke, 2002) (Burgess,
2006). These reference frames interact to guide behavior, but
can also be preferentially used depending on the conditions
of one’s environment. Different circumstances seem to favor
egocentric and allocentric approaches differently (discussed in
Section Environmental Influences on Spatial Reference Frames;
Byrne et al., 2007). Byrne and colleagues describe in their
model how spatial cognition involves separate egocentric and
allocentric neural pathways working together (discussed in
Section Social and Spatial Cognitive Neuroscience). Briefly,
egocentric reference frames appear to be supported by a number
of cortical areas, from primary sensory processing such as
retinotopic maps from primary visual cortex through to posterior
parietal cortex (PPC), including the precuneus and retroplenial
FIGURE 2 | The location of objects can be represented in egocentric
and allocentric spatial reference frames. An egocentric reference frame
represents objects in relation to the location of the self (the observer). An
allocentric reference frame represents objects in relation to one another.
Inspired by Kozhevnikov (2010).
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cortex (Byrne et al., 2007). In contrast, allocentric reference
frames require the representation of environmental locations
with support by the hippocampus and parahippocampal regions,
with interactive connections to the egocentric representations
available through retroplenial cortex (Byrne et al., 2007). In
addition, species-level differences are possible, and might be
based on different ecological pressures. Finally, there is increasing
evidence for individual differences in terms of egocentric and
allocentric strategies used to relate to the embodiment of the self
in space and during spatial navigation.
Sensory abilities influence the use of spatial reference frames.
The default spatial reference frame can differ among individuals
as a function of visual experience (Pasqualotto and Proulx, 2012;
Pasqualotto et al., 2013). Although those with visual experience
tend to use an allocentric (object-based) reference frame, those
without visual experience use an egocentric (self-based) reference
frame to remember object locations. For example blind people
preferentially navigate space using an egocentric, route-based
perspective (Pasqualotto and Proulx, 2012; Pasqualotto et al.,
2013). This is consistent with the preference for an egocentric
route-based approach to navigation by blind persons who are
less efficient in using allocentric map-based approaches or
representations (Steyvers and Kooijman, 2009).
How does sensory information inform spatial reference
frames? Different sensory modalities provide different types of
information about space. Vision is the sensory modality most
relied upon for distal information. This may be demonstrated
in how visual perception influences the perception of distance.
With a consistent, unaltered ground, sighted individuals are just
as accurate at walking to previously viewed objects when their
eyes are closed compared to when they are open, even at large
distances of up to 22m (Sinai et al., 1998). However, various
visual characteristics such as surrounding environment (Lappin
et al., 2006), ground surface structure (Sinai et al., 1998; He et al.,
2004), and ground slant (Stefanucci et al., 2005) can bias these
judgments. These different measures are useful for determining
the extent of embodiment and the mechanisms as well (Wilson
and Golonka, 2013). Further, even in cases where visual stimuli
can be perceived, it may be possible that a later deficiency
in multisensory integration or processing could interfere with
spatial perception. An example of how spatial perception is
embodied as self-perception is the case of an eating disorder.
The “Allocentric Lock Hypothesis” suggests that perhaps a
person with anorexia nervosa views one’s own body from an
allocentric spatial perspective by default, and neural-rewiring
may pose a restriction on the egocentric spatial perspective (Riva,
2012; Riva and Gaudio, 2012). Egocentric perception of one’s
body should necessarily be multisensory in nature, with visual,
somatosensory, kinesthetic, and interoceptive cues providing
an integrated percept; in contrast the allocentric perception of
oneself is largely driving by visual perception via reflections
or mental representations independent of self-perception and
therefore would not correct distortions in interpreting body
perception with other sensory cues. Thus, the spatial reference
frame could directly influence the perception of self.
Egocentric and allocentric are often described as aspects of
personality or social behavior. Egocentrism uses ego, the Latin
word for I; in egocentrism that which thinks is the focus of what
it thinks about, and the frame it thinks through. The modern
conceptualization of egocentrism is attributed to Piaget, who at
first drew upon the influence of Freud while doing scholarly
work on psychoanalysis (Kesselring and Müller, 2011). Piaget
described egocentrism in terms of developmental psychology,
as an aspect of an early stage in cognitive development (Piaget,
1936). According to Piaget, young children are egocentric: they
ascribe their own feelings and experiences to everyone. This
usage of the term has since undergone some modifications,
by Piaget himself, and more broadly in psychology. As Piaget
himself emphasized, the concept of egocentrism is different
from egocentrism in ordinary language, but rather, “Cognitive
egocentrism, as I have tried to make clear, stems from non-
differentiation between one’s own and other possible points of
view and in no way at all from an individualism which precedes
relations with other people” (Piaget, 1995).
Egocentric social behavior is generally considered to be
relatively simple and an early stage of behavioral progression,
not just in terms of human development, but also in terms
of behavioral evolution, since it seems to be phylogenetically
primitive to empathetic behavior. According to the model of
Koski and Sterck, chimpanzees demonstrate aspects of empathy
including emotional mimicry, a distinction between self and
other, and the understanding of mental states of another without
facial cues (although as is the case in humans there exist
individual differences in these capacities within this species Koski
and Sterck, 2009). However, chimpanzees are more egocentric
compared to humans because chimpanzees do not have the
human capacity for cognitive empathy, which involves such
abilities as understanding past, conflicting and hidden emotions
in other individuals (Koski and Sterck, 2009). Indeed, empathy
deficits, such as those arising from narcissism, can directly
influence one’s perception of the world (Jankowiak-Siuda and
Zajkowski, 2013). Consistent with the discussion in a prior
section on the link between spatial and social reference frames,
the key neural structures for empathy such as the insula and
anterior cingulate cortex are also implicated in salience, or the
assignment of attentional priority to sensory information (Frith
and Frith, 2003; Decety and Jackson, 2004; Seeley et al., 2007).
The relative focus of an individual on oneself or on others might
relate directly to basic sensory information processing (Critchley
et al., 2004; Avenanti et al., 2006) in the same way onemight focus
on spatial information.
The term allocentrism (from Greek allos, other) has its origin
in visuospatial cognition. However, allocentric has also been
used in describing social behavior, where allocentrism is a
“tendency” related to the Big Five personality traits (Triandis
et al., 1985). Interestingly, in social behavior the term allocentric
is contrasted with the term idiocentric (rather than egocentric),
apparently borrowing from Freud’s use of the term id (Triandis
et al., 1985). Allocentrism and idiocentrism are considered to be
psychological manifestations of personality at the cultural level,
corresponding to cooperation vs. individualism, respectively
(Triandis et al., 1985). In contrast to the opposition of
egocentricism and empathy described above, allocentricism is
a necessary component of empathy. Being able to take the
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perspective of another is essential to express empathy, though it is
not sufficient because one could understand another’s perspective
without experiencing the emotional feelings that the other is
experiencing (Eisenberg, 2000).
As mentioned above, the terms egocentric and allocentric are
both used to describe social behavior independently, but are
not so often used as a pair. However, Frith et al. (Frith and de
Vignemont, 2005) draw upon the definitions of egocentrism and
allocentrism as used in describing spatial behavior to similarly
classify social behaviors. They emphasize the difference between
the ways in which these terms are used in spatial vs. social studies.
They use this to show that, in spatial behavior, egocentrism,
and allocentrism are complementary: you can switch between
egocentric and allocentric maps in a wayfinding task. In social
behavior they also tend to be complementary. Those with ASD
however lack the task switching ability between allocentric
and egocentric social perspectives—an idea which challenges
the more simplistic notion that ASD is simply a severe case
egocentrism (Frith and de Vignemont, 2005).
Training might also impact whether one attends more to
one’s self, or via different reference frame, to other aspects of
the environment. In meditation one acts to control one’s own
cognitive faculties, in particular attention and emotion (Lutz
et al., 2008). Thus, one’s frame of reference might be altered
within an individual independently of ability, personality, or
spatial and environmental pre-conditions. The techniques set out
to cause changes in frame of reference, mostly related to social
behavior and the sense of self, and perhaps these could also
be related to changes in spatial frames of reference. Meditators
perform more effectively on visual memory and spatial skills
tasks immediately after deity yoga meditation, which focus on
mental imagery (Kozhevnikov et al., 2009), and have more
gray matter in the subiculum of the hippocampus (Luders
et al., 2013), a substructure with functions related to spatial
cognition and stress modulation (O’Mara, 2005). Mindfulness
practice involves attentional training for the ability to be aware
of one’s own thoughts, feelings, and experiences in general and
non-judging terms (Kabat-Zinn, 1990) and has been related to
faster reaction time on a mental rotation task (Geng et al., 2011).
As spiritual and clinical practices, they strive for an impact on
behavior. Ultimately, such practices strive for non-egocentric,
allocentric-like effects on personality such as a “quiet ego” self-
identity (Wayment et al., 2015). An “allo-inclusive” identity
which incorporates the social and physical environment into
the perceived sense of self is a desired identity because such
individuals have lower depression and higher satisfaction, and
feel more connected to others (Leary et al., 2008).
THE OVERLAP IN SOCIAL AND SPATIAL
BEHAVIOR, AND ITS
NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS
Allocentric and Egocentric Aspects of
Social and Spatial Distance
Despite the overlap in the definitions for egocentrism within
the social and spatial spheres, traditionally the fields of spatial
and social cognition are independent. Nonetheless, a few recent
studies have discovered that the spatial and social domains
interact. Recent findings that spatial strategies vary according
to sociability fit well with increasing evidence for embodied
theories of cognition, where mental processes are grounded in
action and perception (Barsalou et al., 2003). Individuals vary
in personality, navigational strategies, and numerous cognitive
and social competencies. Who we are might be integrated with
where we are, and impact how we move through space. Studies
of navigation have been particularly fruitful for understanding
the role of egocentric and allocentric reference frames in spatial
navigation (Passini and Proulx, 1988; Passini, 1996; Pasqualotto
and Proulx, 2012; Pasqualotto et al., 2013).
Several studies imply that individual differences in
representation are possible and might arise from other forms
of experience. Although social behavior does not immediately
seem spatial in nature, some studies have linked social skills
and spatial skills. Work by Shelton et al. (Marchette et al., 2011;
Shelton et al., 2012) found that social skills predicted accuracy
in a spatial perspective-taking task when the task included a
potential agent rather than an object. This finding implies that
our sense of location depends on an interaction between both
the social self and the geometric representation of our body in
space in relation to other people or things.
Spatial reference frames are the fundamental way that
the locations of objects and oneself are represented in an
environment. Similar frames of reference are used in social
contexts as well, such as by using a spatial metaphor such
as a vertical hierarchy to define place and role within a
group (Rodman, 1999). Many real-world tasks require not only
knowing what is where, but who is where: for example, a school
teacher must generally know where different students are in
a classroom and would use assigned seats to simplify such a
representation. Social perspectives change spatial perspectives.
Our language reveals how social relationships are mapped onto
spatial ones: a close friend vs. a distant relation. These mappings
occur on a societal level as well. For example, an American
sample was queried about their social attitudes toward other
nationalities and their spatial estimates of the distance of different
cities in those nations. Participants with negative attitudes toward
Mexicans overestimated how far away south from America
the cities were; similarly, those with negative attitudes toward
Canadians overestimated how far north Canadian cities are
(Kerkman et al., 2004).
Self Movement Perception and Personality
Social perspectives can influence spatial cognition on large scales
that are more abstract. Moreover, there are suggestions that social
aspects of the self, influence even more basic aspects of spatial
cognition at perceptual levels as well. Navigation for a sighted
person appears to be so simple, that it can be done seemingly
unconsciously. One key form of information used is optic flow,
the changing angular movement of points, objects, and surfaces
across the retina as one moves through the environment (Esch
et al., 2001; Warren et al., 2001). The presentation of optic flow
information on a screen when a person is not moving, as one
might view moving stars in a film for instance, also elicits the
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perception of self-motion in humans; this is termed vection.
Although much is known about how to produce vection in
humans with such spatial, dynamic sensory information, less is
known about how aspects of the self that might interact with
the experience of self-motion as a form of embodied cognition,
though there is tantalizing evidence that a relation exists. Seno
found a relationship between vection and personality: narcissistic
people were less affected by motion, presumably because they
are more self-focused than environmentally aware (Seno et al.,
2011). If one’s self is the reference frame through which the
world is perceived, then a more narcissistic perspective would
give less weight to external stimulation, with a greater bias
toward internally generated perceptual states. This provides an
interesting avenue for future research to assess the application
of models of interoception, the perception of the physiological
condition of the body (Craig, 2002), to narcissism and perception.
That is, this account suggests that narcissistic people are better
in interoceptive tasks, and worse in exteroceptive tasks. This
also suggests that people less sensitive to vection would have a
stronger experience of interoception. In the same manner that
narcissism can directly influence perception of the world, so
might general states of enhanced perception of the self (Tsakiris
et al., 2011). There is evidence of influence of brain areas that
process emotion, empathy, and self-awareness on perception in
general, and in psychopathology (Frith and Frith, 2003; Decety
and Jackson, 2004; Seeley et al., 2007; Seth, 2013), suggesting this
might be a fruitful line of further investigation.
SOCIAL AND SPATIAL COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE
Neurophysiology of Self-Mapping and
Navigation
Two major systems of spatial cognition are self-mapping and
navigation, and each are crucial domains for understanding
the role of egocentric and allocentric reference frames. In the
topographic maps of sensory and motor systems, there is a
direct correspondence between spatial coordinates in the body,
and geometric coordinates in the brain. In each case spatial
coordinates from a given sensory or motor surface (e.g., retina
of the eye, skin on the body) are projected on to regions of
the central nervous system. Within the central nervous system,
the relative organization of the coordinates is maintained, and
this organization is further re-projected in inputs to higher
order brain regions. For example, the well-studied retinotopic
maps originate from the retinal surface and occur in regions
receiving visual inputs (Hubel and Wiesel, 1968). Spatial maps
of the image on the retina are replicated first to pre-cortical
regions (e.g., lateral geniculate nucleus, superior colliculus), with
some inputs going on to the primary visual area which process
visual information about the environment. In these regions,
an orderly arrangement of visual inputs from the retina of
the eye is clearly represented by the locations of the neurons
(Figure 3). Retinotopicmaps are also replicated in areas receiving
inputs from V1, such as higher order visual areas and also
multisensory areas of the PPC (Sereno et al., 2001). Typically, a
FIGURE 3 | Retinotopic maps are cortical representations of locations
on the retina, with some distortions arising from the
over-representation of the fovea compared to the periphery. Here this is
represented by a use of tracers injected in the retina that then demarcate
regions of visual stimulation in the visual cortex. The visual stimulus is shown at
the upper left; the white box shows the region of the stimulus that is
represented in this area of the brain, with the lower left example showing this
shape more clearly. The right image is of the stained cortex that represents this
shape. Modified from Tootell et al. (1982).
single functionally-defined visual area is considered to be limited
to one full retinotopic map (Sereno, 1995). Particularly relevant
to the concepts of space and the self are the somatotopic maps
of somatosensory and motor systems, which represent whole
body coordinates (Penfield and Boldrey, 1937). The primary
somatosensory cortex is a single cortical area representing the
entire surface of the skin. A common pictorial representation
of this is a cortical homunculus (see Figure 4). There, apparent
distortion of anatomical regions in the image is because the
location and sizes of individual anatomical regions reflects the
innervation of those regions rather than overall size. This pattern
of cortical magnification, in which anatomical regions which have
greater sensation are better represented in the brain, can extend
to other sensory modalities as well (Catania et al., 2011).
The region of space to which a given neuron responds
to stimuli is called its receptive field. A receptive field is a
property of neurons in both low level and multisensory CNS
regions. In some higher order brain regions, inputs frommultiple
sensory modalities overlap. Thus, some neurons incorporate
information from visual and tactile receptive fields, which are
mapped onto body-centered coordinates. A multisensory neuron
may respond independently to either a tactile stimulus within
its tactile receptive field (e.g., air blown onto a spot on the
face) or a visual stimulus within its visual receptive field (e.g.,
the appearance of an object looming toward the same spot on
the face). The visual receptive field, like the tactile receptive
field, is mapped onto body-centered coordinates, and thus maps
visual space into body-centered reference frames (Graziano
and Cooke, 2006). Somatotopic maps may represent not just
the body itself, but also objects in the space nearby; they
can be extended to include a tool (see below) and also can
represent the body of another (see Section Interacting Neural
Representations of Space and Self). Personal space is a similar
notion which arose from social anthropology (Hall, 1963) and
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FIGURE 4 | The Penfield Homunculus: a visual representation of the mapping of body space in the somatosensory cortex of the brain, with the size of
the body representing the size of the area of cortex devoted to it, and hence the sensitivity of that region as well. From Penfield and Rasmussen (1950).
THE CEREBRAL CORTEX OF MAN. © 1950 Gale, a part of Cengage Learning, Inc. Reproduced by permission: www.cengage.com/permissions.
animal behavior (Hediger, 1950, 1955) and is usually defined
as the space around the body which feels discomfort when it
in entered into by another (Hayduk, 1978). Peripersonal space
is space on and near the body the body for which there is
corresponding activity of neurons that represent its coordinates
(Rizzolatti et al., 1981). Peripersonal space is flexible in that
when a tool is being used by an animal, the animals’ receptive
field, and peripersonal space, is enlarged to incorporate the tool
(Maravita and Iriki, 2004). Personal and peripersonal space have
been studied in social and non-social contexts and have been
associated with distinct neural correlates (Teneggi et al., 2013).
That is, regulation of personal space has been proposed to be
a key role for the amygdala (Kennedy et al., 2009), whereas
peripersonal space (specifically visual space around the face) is
represented in the ventral premotor cortex [area 6 Brozzoli et al.,
2011, 2012], putamen, and the PPC (Sereno and Huang, 2006),
a system which seems to be more generally involved in defense
and danger avoidance (Graziano and Cooke, 2006; Sambo and
Iannetti, 2013), with some suggestions that different peripersonal
representations might exist independently for approach and
defense (Rizzolatti et al., 1997; Cléry et al., 2015; de Vignemont
and Iannetti, 2015) Interestingly, peripersonal space seems to
be built from the bottom up (cognitively impenetrable) as it
is possible for a subject to be aware of a stimulus which
should alter peripersonal space, and yet the peripersonal space
is not altered (Hoogenraad et al., 1994; Kitagawa and Spence,
2005).
The neuroscience of spatial navigation is known largely from
studies of freely moving rats. The hippocampus system has a
declarative memory function that is also important to spatial
perception and navigation in particular (O’Keefe, 1976; Moser
et al., 2008). Whereas, the sensory and motor regions, with
afferents coalescing in multisensory neocortical region such as
the PPC, provide a frame of reference to the body’ and its
anatomical and sensory regions, the hippocampus maintains
an updated representation of space and the animal’s position
within it. The hippocampus is a primitive seahorse-shaped limbic
structure in the medial temporal lobe, is the neuroanatomical
structure most often associated with spatial navigation due to
the mechanisms that support remembering locations. It contains
a population of pyramidal neurons, called “place cells,” that
respond whenever an animal is in a specific location (see
Figure 5; O’Keefe, 1976). Together these produce a dynamic
cognitivemap of the environment by firing in a concerted fashion
(O’Keefe and Dostrovsky, 1971). The neighboring entorhinal
cortex is responsible for the majority of cortical inputs to
the hippocampus and provides the geometric basis of spatial
perception in the hippocampus. An entorhinal “grid cell” is active
when a freely moving animal enters a series of locations in an
environment that the cell represents with a consistent geometric
pattern (Hafting et al., 2005). The grid cells therefore provide a
way for the brain to structure spatial information experienced
through proprioception, which is necessarily serial in acquiring
spatial information unlike retinotopic maps in visual cortex
that receive spatial information in parallel. Unlike retinotopic
maps, the organization of grid cells within the cortex is not
well understood and does not reflect environmental topography
(Hafting et al., 2005). Instead the connections between grid cells
in the entorhinal cortex and place cells in the hippocampus
gives rise to the representation of spatial maps that allow
specific declarativememories to be associated with specific spatial
locations represented by the place cells, which thenmight provide
the basis for allocentric reference frame representation.
The hippocampal and topographic coding systems work
together in spatial navigation tasks. It has been suggested that
they link in parietal association areas of the neocortex, which
are also crucial to spatial perception, contain topographic maps
representing multiple sensory modalities, and may also provide
navigational information (Arbib, 1997). However, the interplay
between this neural network and that of the hippocampus are
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FIGURE 5 | A representation of two grid cells (blue) and a place cell
(orange). The boxes show trajectories of a rat throughout a space with
colored circles representing the regions where the cell fires the most. The grid
cells, located in entorhinal cortex, operate at different spatial scales, and they
project to the place cell in the hippocampus. The place cell convolves the
responses from the grid cells to derive its preferred place at which it responds
most strongly. Modified from Solstad et al. (2006) and from Nobelprize.org.
(2014).
poorly understood (Whitlock et al., 2008). It has been suggested
that parietal representations provide an egocentric frame of
reference, and may map movements along a route according
to route-centered positional information (Nitz, 2009). Similarly,
in neuroscience, body-centered (or body-part-centered) space
which is re-represented in the brain in an topographically
organized manner is sometimes dubbed “egocentric space”
(Schindler and Bartels, 2013), with the implication that this is
the basis for an egocentric spatial perspective. In contrast, the
role of the hippocampus in navigation, with its mechanisms
of representing specific places in long term memory, has been
hypothesized as the basis for allocentric frames of reference
that are survey based rather than route-centered. The term
“allocentric space” is sometimes used to describe a region of
space as represented in an allocentric spatial task involving the
hippocampus (Shrager et al., 2007).
Interacting Neural Representations of
Space and Self
The increasing psychological evidence for relations between
social and spatial cognition are matched by new findings
that suggest overlapping neural networks for processing these
seemingly independent domains. Spatial cognition has many
components, ranging from low-level retinotopic mapping to
high-level spatial reasoning. General spatial awareness is relevant
for social interactions, in that knowing who is where in relation
to oneself is a core aspect of social behavior (Cheney et al.,
1986). The parietal and temporal cortices are both involved
in spatial awareness, as found in neuropsychological studies
of neglect, neuroimaging research, and neurophysiological
recordings (Halligan et al., 2003). The parietal lobe’s role in
various aspect of spatial processing, particularly for directing
spatial attention, is well known (Culham and Kanwisher, 2001).
Parietal cortex also plays a role in social interaction, yet
with a particular spatial role. Neurophysiological recordings in
macaques during social interaction found that the representation
of space in parietal neurons was influenced by social interaction,
particularly by the relation of the other’s movements in relation
to one’s own movements (Fujii et al., 2008). In fact, the coding
of space by parietal neurons was most influenced during times of
conflict rather than just the mere social presence of another (Fujii
et al., 2007).
In some neocortical areas, a neural representation of one’s own
body can map the body of another individual as well. Seeing
another person being touch activates primary somatosensory
cortex, overlapping with somatotopic organization for one’s
own body (Blakemore et al., 2005). In the mirror neurons of
the macaque ventral premotor and inferior parietal cortex, an
individual neuron can represent both one’s own movement,
and the same movement observed by another (Rizzolatti and
Craighero, 2004). Because of its ability to map the other onto
the self, the mirror system has been suggested to be the
basis of empathy, with a central role in the evolution of the
human social behaviors such as imitation and language (Arbib,
2005). Similarly, there is direct correspondence between spatial
maps and social cognition in the ventral intraparietal area,
a multisensory region with a head centered reference frame
(Stepniewska et al., 2005; Sereno and Huang, 2006). A study
in macaques found neurons which share a mapping of own
visuotactile body coordinates and the body coordinates of others’
bodies in a mirror-like fashion (Ishida et al., 2010).
The involvement of the temporal lobe and the temporoparietal
junction in particular, provides another area of overlap between
spatial and social processes (Karnath et al., 2001). As noted
previously, the temporoparietal junction is implicated in spatial
awareness (Halligan et al., 2003). The right temporoparietal
junction has also been found to be crucial for numerous aspects
of social interaction, from low-level attention to high-level
understanding (Decety and Lamm, 2007). Some researchers
argue that the right temporoparietal junction has a particular
specialization for mentalizing, or the understanding of the
mental states of another, in Theory of Mind tasks (Saxe and
Powell, 2006). Although the relations between social and spatial
processing have been examined in the parietal lobe (Fujii et al.,
2008), the overlapping representations in the temporal lobe
suggest that such interactions between space and self might
also be present in the temporoparietal junction. In fact, work
by Blanke and colleagues suggests the temporoparietal junction
indeed plays a role in representing one’s body in space. Some of
his team’s work used virtual reality to disrupt normal perception
to create an out-of-body experience through the manipulation of
multisensory cues (Blanke et al., 2002, 2005; Ionta et al., 2011;
Blanke, 2012), thus impacting the spatial awareness of oneself.
Neural Correlates of Personality and the
Social Self
Numerous brain features have been put forth as possible
correlates of personality, although the particular functions of
these are often obscure. One study found an association between
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neuroticism and the ratio of whole-brain volume to intracranial
volume (Knutson et al., 2001), opening up the possibility that
some general anatomical properties might be behind certain
personality differences. Another study found that self-described
extraverts, when compared to self-described introverts, have
thinner cortical gray matter in regions of the right inferior
prefrontal cortex and fusiform gyrus (Wright et al., 2006)—
areas related to recognition, risk aversion, behavioral inhibition
and language comprehension. According to the same study,
individuals who described themselves as more neurotic have a
thinner cortical mantle in anterior regions of the left orbitofrontal
cortex (Wright et al., 2006)—a region involved in decision-
making and regulating expectation. It is not clear whether the
neuroanatomical variables cause the differences in extraversion
and neuroticism, or inversely, whether the personality traits
result from alterations in regional brain anatomy, which are in
turn caused by differences in lifetime experiences (such as social
and affective experiences; Wright et al., 2006). Previous research
has already pointed to the second possibility (Kolb et al., 2003;
Als et al., 2004) and thus, further research into the topic might
shed some light on the causal relationship between personality
traits and anatomy. Another study found sex differences in
the anatomical representations of extraversion and neuroticism
(Blankstein et al., 2009). Blankstein and colleagues discovered
that in females, extraversion correlated negatively with medial
frontal gyrus gray matter volume, and neuroticism correlated
positively with subgenual anterior cingulate cortex gray matter
volume and cortical thickness (Blankstein et al., 2009)—regions
often associated with social cognition and emotional processing.
Surprisingly, the same traits were inversely correlated with the
same brain regions in males, raising the possibility that sex
differences in neuro-maturational divergence might be behind
these relationships.
The search for the neuroanatomical correlates of the social
self has proven to be extremely difficult, mainly because there
are substantial disagreements as to what exactly is the self.
As described above, following a more spatial, or embodied
definition of the self, the physical self is mapped onto cortex
in a spatially organized fashion, and the mapping of other’s
body can be superimposed over such a representation. Other
neuroanatomical correlates have been suggested using other
definitions of “self ” centered on its narrative, conceptual
properties. Upon defining the self as “temporally stable, trans-
situational consistencies in behavior, dress, or political or
religious ideology” one study in patients with frontotemporal
dementia found that autobiographical memory and motivation
have anatomic representations in the frontal lobes (Miller et al.,
2001). In such patients, change in the self was observed as a
shift from a previously well-defined self to a new well-defined
self, and these changes could have been related to changes in the
frontal lobes. This is supported by the finding that the maturation
of self develops with myelination of frontal structures (Bower
and Gilligan, 1979) and specifically the right hemisphere and the
frontal lobe (Levine et al., 1998; Craik et al., 1999). An attempt
to pin the self to brain structure more specifically has identified
a region of medial prefrontal cortex that was selectively engaged
during self-referential processing (Kelley et al., 2002).
EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES
Evolutionary Ecology Models for the Built
Environment (Spatial and Social Cognition
and Individual Differences)
Spatial and social behaviors are intertwined in many species,
and the evolution and ecology of these behaviors provide many
insights—indeed a foundation as illustrated in Figure 1—for
their psychological and neural bases, and optimal application to
the built environment. There are two main classes of explanatory
factors regarding causation in evolution as postulated by Mayr—
proximate and ultimate (Mayr, 1961). The former class deals with
immediate factors acting upon the organism (i.e., physiology),
while the latter is concerned with evolutionary factors working
over generations (such as natural or sexual selection). Such
distinction has served its purpose in facilitating thinking about
various issues in biology, such as niche construction, cooperation,
and the evolution of language (Laland et al., 2011; Scott-
Phillips et al., 2011) among others, and is undoubtedly useful
in thinking about the evolution, and development of various
human specific behaviors. While psychology and physiology
can answer multitude of questions related to the nature and
development of spatial cognition, personality and the self,
addressing, and answering the ultimate question about why these
phenomena might be linked can be done solely through the
scope of evolutionary theory. Further, evolutionary biology offers
a broad framework which not only informs about our own
species’ past and future, but has the additional advantage of
informing us about other organisms which make up the world
we live in. A consideration of the effect of the environment
on the evolution of behavior, anatomy and physiology—in
general and in the emergence of modern Homo sapiens in
particular—is crucial for prescribing architecture for human
wellbeing.
The notion that the human-built environment can influence
the course of evolution in any species has been gaining support
in recent studies (Hunter, 2007) and has implications about the
importance of the built environment for humans in particular.
Several species may be adapted to urban environments: city
spiders are larger, urban rivers salmon are smaller, city
earthworms are more tolerant to metals, urban plants disperse
fewer seeds (Alberti, 2015). Urban songbirds have acoustic
signals and personalities better suited to the urban environment:
European blackbirds in particular switch to more sedentary
lifestyle and modify their migratory behavior in response to
urbanization (Partecke et al., 2006; Miranda et al., 2013). If such
human-mediated ecosystem changes lead to rapid changes in
the course of evolution of other species, then recent changes
have likely been occurring in our species, too. Understanding
the evolutionary pressures acting upon human and other species’
behavior and anatomy is critical in order to make urban
ecosystems favorable to our wellbeing. Thus, in this following
section we outline the contribution of both spatial and social
pressures in shaping primate evolution in an attempt to shed light
on some of the evolutionary pressures that led to the evolution of
modern humans.
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Advancements in both spatial cognition (Parker and Gibson,
1979; Baumeister, 1987) and social cognition (Jolly, 1966;
Humphrey, 1976; Wynn, 1985) have been implicated as
important factors in shaping a multitude of human behaviors.
However, these are often posed in opposition to each other as
drivers of cognitive evolution (Boyd and Silk, 2009). Decades
ago, Milton (1981, 1988) emphasized the importance of spatial
cognition in primate and human evolution—a notion called
the “ecological intelligence” hypothesis. It suggests that different
ecological challenges (such as extractive foraging, diet breadth,
seasonality) aremain drivers of cognitive evolution in that animal
order. However, this idea has fallen into disfavor in recent
years, due largely to the popularity of the “social intelligence”
hypothesis. In the “social intelligence” hypothesis, Dunbar
et al. (Dunbar, 1992; Dunbar and Shultz, 2007) suggested that
sociality (indicated by group size) drives cognitive evolution
and advanced intelligence, and is also a determinant of relative
neocortex size. The debate is far from settled, for example
the social intelligence hypothesis was recently challenged by
MacLean et al. (2014), who suggested that social group size
was unrelated to brain size and intelligence (represented
by the executive function of self-control) and pointed to
foraging challenges (diet breadth) as a better predictor for
cognitive performance within the primate order (MacLean et al.,
2014).
In fact, the view we support here is that social and spatial
factors were both prime movers in primate cognitive evolution,
and likely co-evolved inter-dependently for behavioral and
neuroanatomical reasons. First, primate foraging posits cognitive
demands beyond those of other animals, and can include
long-distance movement through a three dimensional arboreal
environment, the acquisition of rare and high-quality foods,
tool use, the carrying of young, and communication (Janmaat
et al., 2013; Ban et al., 2014). The evidence so far suggests that
primates owe their large brains and advanced cognition to finding
food (foraging challenges), and that neural and cognitive features
were then later co-opted for social behavior (Zuberbühler and
Janmaat, 2010).
Second, the neuroanatomical substrates for spatial cognition
may have been co-opted for social cognition, perhaps very early
in the mammalian lineage, and thus the trend would have already
existed well before the primate radiation. Brain areas which
represent space topographically are conserved across vertebrates,
and more recent cortical areas with similar organization have
been proposed as the basis of the most complex primate social
behaviors. For example, retinotopy is a feature of the tectum
(superior colliculus) which is a primitive structure in the primate
brain that uses retinotopic maps to guide eye saccades and
other movements body parts in space (Lane et al., 1973). The
retinotopic organization is evolutionary conserved and is also
seen in the most primitive non-mammalian vertebrates in which
the optic tectum is the primary structure directing visually-
guided movements (Cornide-Petronio et al., 2011; Gandhi and
Katnani, 2011). Similarly motor neurons tend to be arranged
somatotopically in vertebrate brains [Graziano and Aflalo, 2007;
even though this is not always necessary for complex movements
Zullo et al., 2009]. The somatotopic organization of body parts
in the cortex could allow for their coordination in complex
movements (Graziano et al., 2002). Topographic organization
in sensory and motor modalities is also maintained in the
mirror neuron system in which neurons are active both in
conducting a movement of oneself, and in seeing the movement
demonstrated by another (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). There
is some debate surrounding the specific reference frames that
mirror neurons employ, such as an abstract representation of
space independent of modality (Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998),
a somatotopic organization of responses that mirror what is
seen (Buccino et al., 2001), or changes in processing as a
function of whether the actions are within or outside the animal’s
peripersonal space (Caggiano et al., 2009). Regardless the role of
spatial topography in complex movement would extend to all of
these mirror system behaviors, even if the specific topography
differs. The mirror system could have set the basis for behaviors
of empathy and imitation (Iacoboni, 2009). It is suggested
to have evolved in function in seven stages coinciding with
increasing social complexity, starting from “cortical control of
hand movements (S1),” “A simple imitation system for grasping
shared with common ancestor of human and chimpanzee” (S3),
and eventually language (S7) (Arbib, 2007). As mentioned above,
neocorticalization is key trend coincident with increasing social
complexity across species; neocortical areas could also expand to
represent space with higher acuity (de Sousa and Proulx, 2014),
or in more modality-specific domains (Changizi, 2001).
There may also be overlapping trends in the evolution of
spatial and social cognition in the hippocampal system, which
is involved in both. The ecological variable best associated with
spatial cognition and used to compare behaviors across species is
the size of the home range, defined by Burt as “that area traversed
by the individual in its normal activities of food gathering,
mating, and caring for young”(Burt, 1943). It has been suggested
that home range is a driving factor of mental ability generally
(Milton, 1981), although more particularly it is thought that
home range determines spatial navigational demands, and spatial
navigational demands drive spatial ability (Jacobs et al., 1990). In
fact, Powell and Mitchell (2012) define home range cognitively,
in that “home range is that part of an animal’s cognitive map of
its environment that it chooses to keep updated.” Studies have
suggested a direct link across species of rodents (Jacobs and
Spencer, 1994), and birds [the “avian hippocampus” is the medial
pallial zone Rodríguez et al., 2002; Krebs et al., 1989; Sherry et al.,
1989; Garamszegi and Eens, 2004; Lucas et al., 2004] between
advanced spatial behaviors, including maintaining large home
ranges and remembering and find food caches, and the average
size of the hippocampus. Also in humans, there is interindividual
variability in ranging, which is linked to hippocampal function:
the volumetric reorganization of the hippocampus has been
directly related to the occupational specialization in spatial
memory, as with the increased size of the hippocampi of taxi-
cab drivers (Maguire et al., 2000). The hippocampus plays a
critical role in memory consolidation (from short term to long
term memory; Squire, 1992; Squire and Alvarez, 1995), and
has minor roles in behavioral inhibition (Taylor et al., 2014)
and olfactory memory (Kaut et al., 2003). In addition the
hippocampus may be split into distinct social and spatial parts.
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Recently, CA2, an obscure subregion of the hippocampus for
which little was functionally known, has been implicated in the
encoding of social memory (Hitti and Siegelbaum, 2014), and
for attacking male intruders (Pagani et al., 2015), although it
does not code for space in the same way as other hippocampal
subregions (Mankin et al., 2015). It is also the case that in a
task in which humans have to bring up knowledge of social
networks the anterior hippocampus was selectively activated
(Kumaran et al., 2012), although the same neural networks
are not known to be involved in navigating social and spatial
networks (Kumaran and Maguire, 2005). Interestingly, these
novel findings provide direct evidence for the interrelatedness of
both the social and spatial aspects of memory. Dunbar speculated
that the number of neocortical neurons is a limiting factor in
determining the number of social relationships which an animal
can monitor (Dunbar, 1992); given the role of the hippocampus
in social memory in particular it should also be an important
consideration.
Additionally, individual differences have been shown to
be present in numerous vertebrate and invertebrate species
and to have fitness consequences (Réale et al., 2007). While
genetically-encoded conditional strategies are useful adaptations
in the face of highly predictable changes (Stephens, 1991),
individual differences, and different experiences, can serve to
shape the organism’s response to unpredictable or fast change
(Shettleworth, 2010). For example, individual differences in
search strategies have been shown to be consistent within many
species (Giraldeau and Dubois, 2008) and in some they are
part of broader behavioral syndromes including aggressiveness,
the propensity to use social cues, and learning performance
(Marchetti and Drent, 2000). In some species it has been
shown that individual differences underlie the tendency to
use own experience vs. learning from others (Giraldeau and
Dubois, 2008). In that respect, the evolution and maintenance
of personality differences plays a major role in determining
individuals’ proclivity to use social information, and has
important fitness consequences (Reader, 2015). Another example
points to the importance of early life experience in shaping
individual differences in spatial cognition: in egg-laying hens
(Gallus gallus domesticus), individuals raised in cages performed
slower and showed impaired working memory in comparison to
aviary raised chicks in hole-board exploration task (Tahamtani
et al., 2015). Similarly, the role of experience in shaping the
preferred spatial reference frame in humans has been shown to
depend largely on cultural background (Goeke et al., 2015). These
findings suggest that genetically encoded conditional strategies
serve their function in maintenance of individual differences,
but personal experience is a powerful proximate cause for such
differences. When faced with a rapidly changing environment,
such as a human-built environment, individual differences can
influence both spatial and social cognition, and this can have
fitness consequences.
Spatial and Social Cognition in Human
Evolution
Advancements in tool making and brain reorganization
consistent with improved spatial cognition appear early in
human evolution, and continue through to the emergence of
our species (de Sousa and Cunha, 2012). As indicted above,
primates have high demands for spatial ability. Additional
demands on human spatial ability include tool making, large
home ranges, and migration. These early behaviors may have
depended on novel social communication attributes such as
empathy and language. For example, the ability of humans
to manufacture tools has been closely linked to our ability to
communicate socially with one another (Stout and Chaminade,
2009). An experimental study found that teaching and language
were likely involved in the production of Acheulean tools, the
first tools exhibiting spatial conceptualization due to symmetry
and form consistency (the technology persisted across much of
the Old World and covered a time period of ∼1 million years;
Morgan et al., 2015). Migration and large home ranges may put
individuals at increased risk for predation and environmental
stressors. In non-human primates these stressors may be
accommodated for by an increase in social group size (Hill and
Lee, 1998), but migration and home range expansion literally
move conspecifics away from each other. Therefore, major
advancements in social communication such as language and
teaching could be even more important when fewer social
relations are available. Also, major advancements in spatial
cognition might have been vital to colonizing new ecological
zones. The earliest human shelters, constructed during the
Paleolithic (de Lumley, 1966), would have been instances in
which building environments would have enabled hominins
to define and recreate spaces in three dimensions for novel
purposes.
Tool-use and tool-making place special demands on spatial
cognition at the level of the individual, as well. When an
individual uses a tool it becomes an extension of the self as it
is incorporated into pre-existing topographic map of the body,
something well studied in higher primates (Iriki et al., 1996).
Additionally, humansmakes tools which do not directly resemble
the substrate from which they are made, thus tool making has
been suggested to place demands on spatial cognition not found
in other species (Wynn, 1985). Functional neuroanatomical
studies in humans have revealed shared neural systems for tool
production and language (Stout and Chaminade, 2009; Uomini
and Meyer, 2013). The motor acts of speech and tool-making
are both hierarchically structured sequences of behavioral “units”;
thus it has often been wondered whether there is any meaningful
correspondence between these (Holloway, 1969). It has been
posited that in the human lineage neural systems originally
serving in visuotactile-spatial function were later co-opted for a
particularly social function: human language. The mirror system
hypothesis draws upon the putative homologous relationship
between the monkey area F5, which is a hand motor area
containing mirror neurons and involved in tool use, and the
human Broca’s area, involved in motor control of oro-laryngeal
movements and speech production. According to this model,
the mirror system for matching observation and execution of
hand movements sets the basis for social communication and
eventually human speech (Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998).
Early transitional hominins have been suggested to exhibit
a shift to upright, bipedal posture (Lovejoy et al., 2009).
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Although the timing and nature of this transition is hotly
debated, what is clear is that hominins became habitually
bipedal and colonized a vast geographic range well before they
demonstrated fully modern behavior, cognition, or brain size
(de Sousa and Wood, 2007; de Sousa and Cunha, 2012). The
earliest dated evidence of hominin intercontinental migration,
for example, comes from Homo erectus at the surprisingly early
site Dmanisi, in Georgia, 1.8 million years ago (Finlayson, 2005).
It is only possible to speculate about whether spatial navigation
strategiesmay have emerged to enable earlymigrations. However,
compared to our closest living ancestor, the chimpanzee, humans
possess a tool which can greatly facilitate spatial navigation: the
physical map. Maps are “the symbolic system par excellence
for encoding and permanently retaining spatial information”
(Landau and Lakusta, 2009). Creating a map requires making
spatial transformations, which are symbolic and yet they are
analog to what they represent, unlike language (Landau and
Lakusta, 2009). It has been suggested that the earliest map
was created and used by members of our species: an engraved
piece of ivory at the Upper Paleolithic site Mezhirich in the
Ukraine (Bahn and Vertut, 1997). Furthermore, the capacity
to use a map-like object, such as a scale model, might be a
human-specific ability; though only one study has attempted to
assess this, and failed, in chimpanzees with a complex task that
might have required additional abilities (Kuhlmeier and Boysen,
2001). Although the data are few, attempts have been made to
interpret prehistoric hominin space use patterns (Wren et al.,
2014) in order to understand human specific aspects of spatial
cognition, and in particular to seek evidence of egocentric and
allocentric strategies (Burke, 2012). It would be a hard task to
study individual differences in human fossils, and how these
may relate to spatial cognition. Yet, it is possible to compare
different groups of fossils, such as species or populations. Like
modern humans, our close fossil relatives the Neanderthals
structured domestic spaces into distinct zones (Riel-Salvatore
et al., 2013). Still, it is suggested that modern humans might
have had advantages in spatial navigation, even compared to
the Neanderthals, and that sexual selection has played an
important role in the evolution of spatial cognition (Burke,
2012).
THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT
Environmental Influences on Spatial
Reference Frames
How might design influence spatial cognition directly, and
(perhaps) social cognition indirectly? Given the foundation in
evolutionary theory, and the relation between the psychological
concepts of space and self (see Figure 1), there are a number of
personal and environmental variables that influence the reliance
on egocentric and allocentric frames of reference (Ekstrom
et al., 2014). First consider a number of environmental variables:
(a) the size of the space; (b) the geometric structure of the
environment; (c) the complexity of the environment; and (d)
the landmarks available in the environment. Also consider a
number of variables that appear to be more personal in terms of
individual differences, though each of these can be influenced by
the structure of the environment presented to an individual: (a)
the manner of acquiring spatial information; (b) familiarity with
an environment; (c) the duration of time spent in the space; (d)
how one moves through a space; (e) the presence of social beings
vs. objects; and (f) the personality of the individual.
The size of the space can clearly influence the reference
frame used (Presson et al., 1989; Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 1998).
For example, if the space is smaller, and the organism has not
had extensive experience with the space, then an allocentric
representationmight not be required, with even the hippocampal
processing being unnecessary for small enough spaces (Day et al.,
1999). Similarly, if one can see the area in question, having a
“vista” of the locations allows one to rely solely on an egocentric
rather than an allocentric reference frame (Meilinger et al., 2014).
The geometric structure of the environment also influences the
reference frame used. In work reviewed elsewhere here, the
intrinsic structure of locations, say in ordered rows and columns,
can determine whether egocentric or allocentric representations
are used independent of the viewpoint one has had (McNamara
et al., 2003). Other environmental influences include complexity
and the existence of landmarks. If the organization of locations
is more complex, then there might be a shift from egocentric to
allocentric frames. Similarly, if there are clear landmarks, then an
allocentric frame is possible; if there are none, then an egocentric
reference frame dominates (Shelton and McNamara, 2001).
The environment can also be structured to influence a number
of aspects of individual learning and experience that affect
the spatial reference frames used. The way of learning spatial
information impacts the reference frame used (Presson and
Hazelrigg, 1984). For example, learning a new environment
with a map leads to an allocentric representation, yet route
learning is more likely to lead to an egocentric representation.
One’s familiarity with a space can influence reference frames,
too. The greater familiarity one has with a place increases the
knowledge one has of different perspectives and orientations,
which affords an allocentric representation (Evans and Pezdek,
1980; Thorndyke and Hayes-Roth, 1982; Ruggiero et al., 2009;
Iachini et al., 2014). Similarly, the amount of time one is
exposed to an environment leads to a shift from an egocentric
reference frame arising from momentary experience, to an
allocentric reference frame based on additional experience. This
also suggests that having unrestricted movement in the space
over time allows for the experience of multiple paths and
perspectives as well for gaining allocentric knowledge. As noted
in prior sections, the presence of others, rather than just objects
(Shelton et al., 2012), and the personality of the individual in the
environment (Seno et al., 2011) are other individual differences
that interact with the structure of the environment.
Confinement in the Built Environment:
Impacts on Social and Spatial Cognition
We have thus far suggested how spatial factors interact with
personality, individual differences, the social self, and perception.
How might impositions on space from the built environment
affect social and spatial cognition?
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Incarceration is an extreme and long term restriction of
movement in space which has recently received much political,
social, and media attention. Whether in the sphere of prison
reforms and attitudes surrounding punishment, or through the
questions of how best to care for those with severe health
problems, the questions surrounding the practice of “putting
away” people deemed to be reprehensible, risky, or in danger
is one which evokes strong feelings and generates much
controversy and discussion.
Within philosophy, growing attention is being given to
what might be interpreted as disorders of confinement such
as claustrophobia (Trigg, 2012) and agoraphobia (Jacobson,
2004, 2011). In both instances, the person suffers from atypical
constructions of confinement, felt as a constriction in lived
spatiality. Recent work has explored how this structures the way
a person engages with their environment, with other people,
and with their projects (Heidegger, 1962; Merleau-Ponty, 1962;
Husserl, 1989; Aiken, 2011; Krueger, 2013). Others have explored
the way in which spatial construction influences and stems
from “socio-political relations” (Foucault, 1973, 1976; Harvey,
1973; Lefebvre, 1991; Massey, 2005). However, there has not yet
been much attention devoted to the effect which an imposed
constriction of spatiality has on the individual, their personality
andmental health, and also the way in which experience comes to
be restructured for them. Likewise, though there has been much
consideration of the ways in which our “situatedness” in a social
world and embodiment structures both social cognition (De
Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; De Jaegher, 2009) and intersubjective
understanding (Gallagher et al., 2002; Gallagher and Brøsted
Sørensen, 2006; Gallagher, 2007, 2008, 2015), there has been
surprisingly little attention devoted to developing an account of
the role which spatiality plays in both these spheres.
Human beings are always spatial beings (Heidegger, 1962),
with a basic relationality in which spaces are shaped in relation
to activities we are engaged and involved in. In Heidegger’s
treatment and exploration of “regions” of space in Being and
Time, he writes that we are Being-in-the-world, in which
the “in” designates a basic relationality in which spaces are
shaped in relation to activities we are engaged and involved in
Heidegger (1962) and Husserl (1989). Groupings of equipment
become salient in the field of action, to create regions of
activity. In this way, space is made significant by a person’s
projects. Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of spatiality complements and
builds on that of Heidegger to offer consideration of how
embodiment shapes an experience of space. Merleau-Ponty
argues that experience of spatiality is constructed in relation
to our bodily abilities and limitations; our body throws open
a world of possibilities which impact on the way in which
we apprehend, move through, act within, and relate to our
spatiality (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Contrariwise, the question
of how bodily limitations—through illness or incarceration—
double back to effect the ways in which a person experiences the
possibilities which are available and open to them must, then, be
asked.
How would the restricted environment of an incarcerated
person influence their perception for self? Long term
inmates frequently report changes to their sense of lived
time in which references to deep boredom, and feelings of
damnation and despair abound. There is also a growing
field of work which seeks to understand changes to
temporality in varying forms of illness (Minkowski, 1970;
Fuchs, 2012; Ratcliffe, 2012). It is important to note that
incarceration is an example of involuntary confinement
in a restricted space, often alone. What about voluntary
confinement?
Living in space and space travel, such as planned missions to
Mars, require long periods of confinement, though voluntarily
accepted and often not in social isolation. A number of studies
have examined how such confinement during actual missions
influences one’s perceptual and cognitive abilities. For example,
distance estimation and size perception, such as that studied
with visual illusions, are both impacted by the combination
of a restricted environment and microgravity (Clément et al.,
2012, 2013). Other studies have examined voluntary confinement
through studies of submariners, who also do not have the
windows that provide far-distance cues that astronauts have.
Although the vision of submariners remained in the normal
range, there was evidence for negative outcomes due to the
restricted space such as increased myopia (short-sightedness),
decreased accuracy in distance estimation, and muscular control
issues (Kinney et al., 1979). Perception and memory for visual
scenes have also been found to be impacted by time spent
in a confined environment. Confinement to a space seems to
impact the boundary extension effect. Normally, people exhibit
boundary extension when remembering visual images; that is,
people are more likely to recognize a wide-angle, zoomed-
out, image as the one they saw rather than the actual image
seen (Intraub and Richardson, 1989). Volunteers who spent
105 days in a windowless space, to study confinement of the
sort expected with space travel, were tested on their ability
to recognize images of scenes (Lukavský, 2014). Although
control participants who were not confined exhibited no
changes in the boundary extension effect, the effect increased
in volunteers who were confined, likely due to the impact of
experiencing such a small space for such a long period of
time. Distance estimation is poorer when made in a confined
space, like a corridor (Lappin et al., 2006), and it appears that
long-term confinement influences perceived distance in two-
dimensional images as well. Longer-term confinement might
have even broader psychological implications. Similar studies
of changes in visual cognition due to voluntary confinement of
500 days for a similar simulated space mission were difficult
to study due to increased apathy and fatigue (Lukavský,
2014; Sikl and Simecek, 2014). The social isolation that
accompanies incarceration might give rise to even greater
difficulties.
The benefits of building designs can be compared in terms
of quantitative data about health, stress, and other aspects of
physiology (Edelstein, 2013). Hospitals provide an interesting
format for studying this because patient health is monitored
and patient mobility is limited. An impactful study found that
post-surgical recovery time may be reduced with a window
view (Ulrich, 1984). This finding is typically likened to Ulrich’s
“nature restoration hypothesis” based on a preference for natural
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scenes over urban ones, but could also have to do with the
allusion to overall spatiality offered by a natural scene—and
might help explain a particular preference for seeing water
(Ulrich, 1979). In a study using virtual spaces, it was found
that physiological stress responses are reduced in rooms which
offer escape routes (Fich et al., 2014). Speaking of recovery of
patients, Toombs writes “Whereas the restoration of wholeness
may be limited in terms of restoring bodily integrity or
eradicating ‘disease’, the physician can assist the patient in
regaining control (even if it is only limited control), overcoming
helplessness and thus retaining the freedom to act” (Toombs,
1992). These three areas of “control,” “overcoming helplessness,”
and maintaining “freedom to act” are areas in which spatial
planning and design can perform a key role. In characterizing
the relationship between person and world as one which is
necessarily shaped by, and through, bodily phenomenology,
Merleau-Ponty presents the world in terms of the “I can.” Our
bodies, in constraining the things that we experience as possible,
impossible, challenging, comforting, and so on, opens up and
presents possibilities for action and activity (Merleau-Ponty,
1962). For Merleau-Ponty this also affects our intersubjective
relationships with others. Intersubjectivity is shaped through
intercorporeality (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 1964). In illness bodily
transparency—which captures the way in which we do not
ordinarily notice our body, which Merleau-Ponty argues is the
norm of the “I can,” gives way to opacity and reconfigures
experience in terms of “I cannot.” The body, instead of opening
up the world, becomes an obstacle: things must be done
in spite of it (Fuchs, 2005). This has potential to directly
influence the way in which spaces are perceived, in particular
as ones in which we may participate or not. The question
then becomes how recovery spaces can be designed to lessen
the magnitude of the “I cannot” in order to provide a feeling
of “control” and ability to navigate the space, and daily tasks,
successfully.
Urban planning and building design can reflect both the
needs and culture of those using it, and also potentially
affect the cultural and social experience of the inhabitants.
Studies of confinement could give insight into how the
perception of space is influenced by and influences aspects
of the self-defined individual or as part of the culture the
individuals come from. The research should also indicate
how the non-visual perception of space and self-motion can
influence the perception of space and magnitude, and thus be
applied to buildings (real or virtual) created for the sensory
or physically impaired. The layout and construction of a
building might better promote successful navigation for those
with sensory impairments (Passini and Proulx, 1988), and
those inclusive design principles in turn might be better for
everyone independent of having impairments or not (Passini,
1996).
Spatial Behavior: From Architecture to
Neuroscience, and Vice Versa
Who we are is where we are. Our minds map ours bodies
and the world around us. As discussed above, egocentric and
allocentric reference frames are often studied as two opposing
spatial strategies in navigation and other aspects of spatial
cognition, however, these may actually be linked across social and
spatial cognition. Individual differences in cognitive and sensory
abilities impact navigation as well (Passini and Proulx, 1988;
Marquardt and Schmieg, 2009; Marquardt, 2011; Pasqualotto
and Proulx, 2012; Pasqualotto et al., 2013). Not only do aspects
of the individual, or the self, impact spatial cognition, but
properties of the social and physical environment can impact that
as well. Certain built structures could invite different strategies
in navigation, and may result in different perspectives of the
self in relation to other objects. For example, we invite a
reconsideration of confinement, in which the lack of mobility in
space could also impair perspectives of the social and emotional
self. A well-built environment can promote the best in well-
being for positive health outcomes and social behavior (Aries
et al., 2010; Lawson, 2010). Aspects of spatial cognition may be
trademarks of the human experience that should be afforded
to all, thus we advise built environments to address all abilities
through inclusive design. Recently, architects and urban planners
have begun to incorporate considerations of the abilities and
references frames of those using the space to optimize design
of the built environment to support successful navigation with
inclusive design that considers how building for the visually
(or otherwise) impaired might be best for everyone (Passini,
1996).
Our review has further implications for designing public
housing spaces, social spaces, and even nurseries. The fact
that experience can shape individual differences, which in
turn can affect the quality of spatial and social cognition,
suggests that growing up in certain built environments can
have detrimental or beneficial effects on cognitive ability. For
example, blocks of flats, which introduce a major third vertical
dimension to navigation (Jeffery et al., 2013; Pasqualotto and
Proulx, 2013), and at the same time providing limited spatial
perception due to walls and other visual constraints, might
play a major role in shaping cognition via both proximate and
ultimate mechanisms. No study, according to our knowledge,
has ever addressed the possible personality, spatial reference
frame proclivity, or social cognition differences between block
vs. house vs. open space dwellers. Additionally, nurseries, an
early life environment which also has the ability to shape
personality differences, and thus cognition, has never come
into scrutiny regarding its architectural properties. Raising
children in enclosed spaces vs. open spaces, or such with
abundance of windows or glass walls, is supposed to result
in differences in spatial and social cognition and is another
issue worth addressing in light of this review. In terms of
planning social spaces around public housing and elsewhere,
an important point is again keeping in mind the interplay
between spatial and social cognition and individual differences.
Equal access to such places should be provided to everyone,
disregarding bodily constraints. Planning for such accessibility
would assure equal chances for “experience” for both able and
disabled people, and provide equal opportunities for personal
development. Another area which might benefit from further
research in this direction is planning of spaces where political
decisions are usually made—i.e., town halls or parliaments.
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The extent to which these provide constraints or enable
individuals in spatial and social perception, in interaction with
individual differences, might result in more effective policy
making.
This is a solid start, but could be extended with further
consideration of the interactions of spatial cognition and
ability, personality, and differences in cognition. Where we are
might mold who we are, but given our ability to shape the
environment, we can play an active role in the development of the
self.
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